






Philosophical Practice in the
Light of the “War of the Sexes”
Abstract
According to Nietzsche, the fundamental problem between a man and a woman is rooted 
in the denial of antagonism between them. The man believes that their relationship must 
be that of eternal hostile tension and unavoidable injustice. Nietzsche asserts that there 
must be a rank order, where scaling is related to the actions of taking, accumulating and 
becoming greater by gaining power and overcoming narrower interpretations.  This rank 
scaling does not allow for identicalness and equality, which are signs of the shallowness 
of instinct and the loss of one’s identity. Nietzsche endorses the difference and celebrates 
the otherness. Flourishing of an individual can never be interfered by the concept of equal 
relations. Nietzsche is convinced that people are different, and he advocates for agon  (a  
power  struggle)  as  a  model  of  cultural  and  political  relations.  Since  equality  of  human  
beings must consist of an equal amount of the same feature, Nietzsche sees this equality 
as  being represented in  the  general  will  to  power.  Furthermore,  the  gender  difference  is  
also a socially constructed way of being. It is a creation of man’s image of how the world 
should look like. If included in a therapeutic approach, this perspective can shed new light 
on possible interventions methods in psychotherapy and philotherapy alike. Sex and sexual 
relationships  can  be  singled  out  as  key  problems  that  prevail  in  the  core  of  motivation  
for  seeking  professional  therapeutic  help  (psychotherapy),  no  matter  what  therapeutic  
approach is used in such practice. It is a topic that has insufficiently drawn on Nietzsche’s 
legacy. The aim of this paper is to provide arguments that Nietzsche’s perspective on “war 







the  psyche  by  examining  it  in  detail  within  the  context  of  the  problem  of  
sexes.	Nietzsche’s	perspective	on	psychotherapy	is	founded	on	the	contested	
conventional	notion	of	 the	self.	 In	his	concept	of	 the	self,	 the	making	of	a	
place is related to the social making of embodiment. Nietzsche claimed that 
“body I	am	entirely,	and	nothing	else;	and	soul	is	only	a	word	for	something	
about the body”.1	Body	is	“a	unity	as	an	organisation”2	and	is,	therefore,	“a	
work  of  art”.3	Nietzsche’s	 viewpoint	 on	 this	 remains	valid	 even	nowadays	
1   
Friedrich	Nietzsche,	Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
A Book for All and None,	trans.	Walter	Arnold	
Kaufmann,	Penguin,	New	York	1966,	p.	31.
2   
Friedrich	 Nietzsche,	 The  Birth  of  Tragedy,	 
 
trans.	 Douglas	 Smith,	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	Oxford	2008,	fr.	2,	p.	10.






pear	 to	have	 the	 intent	 to	close	 the	discussion	about	 the	subject	as	a	 locus	
of	rationality	and	autonomy.	Postmodernists	see	this	subject	and	the	human	
agency	simply	as	a	textual	creation	–	a	component	of	local	narrative,	but	not	




used in philosophical practice that uses such philosophical insights and phil-
osophical methods to help people presume considerable issues in their lives. 
In	the	contemporary	culture	dominated	by	neoliberal	values,	Nietzsche’s	per-
spective sparks interest and calls for a re-examination.
As	“the	first	psychologist”	of	the	eternally	feminine,	Nietzsche	is	not	certain	
about whether or not to advise women to defeminise themselves in this man-
ner	and	thus	emulate	all	the	irrationalities	that	stem	from	the	concept	of	“man-
liness”	of	“the	European	man”,	who	bring	women	down	to	the	low	standards	
of	“general	culture”.4 He is referring to the feminine essence as a social con-
struction that individual women need not exemplify. Nietzsche is concerned 
about the emancipation of masculinise women and undermines their power 
since	being	a	female	means	power.	He	opposes	women’s	emancipation	be-
cause	he	believes	that	it	serves	to	“the	destruction	of	the	will	to	power	and	
encourages the herd mentality”.5 Similarly to the notion of pity,	feminism	be-
came	“a	shorthand”	for	all	the	forces	of	decadence	besetting	modern	Europe.6 
Under	its	influence,	women	will	acquire	all	the	masculine	virtues	and	forces	
and  take  all  the  masculine  weaknesses  and  vices  into  the  bargain.7  Where  
masculine	 and	 feminine	 are	 cultural	masks	 that	 can	 change,	 the	 biological	
sexes	remain.	Nietzsche	insisted	on	the	“war	of	the	sexes”	as	the	necessary	
tension that generates the creative individual.8 
Nietzsche is convinced that the push for female equality is driven by resent-
ment and  self-interest  of  the  inferior.9  The  ideas  on  equal  rights  represent  
only	an	expression	and,	essentially,	“belong	to	decline”.10	Equality	suppresses	
“feelings	of	 rivalry,	 of	 resentment	of	 any”	 in	 the	 lower	 classes.	 In	his	 ini-
tial	works	on	the	women’s	call	for	independence,	Nietzsche	emphasised	re-











pation	of	women”,	 he	wrote	 that	 it	 is	 demanded	 and	promoted	by	women	
themselves	 (and	not	merely	by	“shallow”	males),	which	he	sees	as	an	odd	
symptom of the increasing weakening and dulling of the most feminine in-
stincts.	There	is	“stupidity”	in	this	movement,	an	almost	masculine	stupidi-
ty,	he	believes.12	As	for	misogynists,	Nietzsche	claimed	that	they	hate	them-






immoderate  drive  which  hates  not  only  itself  but  its  means  of  satisfaction  
as  well”.13  There  is  inherent  sexism in  the  claim that  women are  means  of  
“satisfaction”	to	men.	Nietzsche	indicated	that	misogyny	is	a	form	of	self-ha-
tred;	men	who	dislike	women	resent	humanity	as	well.	Misogynists	do	not	
see women outside and beyond conventional and normative sexual arrange-
ments.	Contrary	 to	 that,	 to	 address	 the	example	of	 “man	and	woman”	and	
look	towards	the	“cardinal	problem”,	one	ought	to	look	beyond	appearances	





would hate himself since he based his understanding of life on the constant 
struggle	to	overcome	his	own	weaknesses.	Nietzsche’s	writings	suggest	ways	
of thinking about human differences that encourage us to consider the needs 
and	desires	of	our	own	bodies	beyond	the	dichotomy	of	“man”	and	“wom-
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way of men is will,	and	the	way	of	women	is	willingness:
“That	is	the	law	of	the	sexes;	truly	a	hard	law	for	women!”23



































countering	 the	moral	 archetype	 of	 the	 “good	man”	 and	 the	Enlightenment	
ideal	 of	 a	 rational	man.	No	 “social	 contract”	 can	 correct	 the	 inequality	 of	
women	and	the	necessary	injustice	in	the	relationship	between	men	and	wom-
en.28	Nietzsche	views	justice	as	equivalent	to	power,	something	which	is	not	




according to this image.29











most womanly instincts. That woman should venture forward when the fear-inspiring quality 
in	man	–	or	more	definitely,	the	man	in	man	–	is	no	longer	either	desired	or	fully	developed,	is	
reasonable enough and also intelligible enough.”30
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oppressed groups have made the mistake of putting themselves in the place 
of	their	oppressors	or	masters.	They	seek	to	obtain	the	power	of	the	master,	
or	“aspire	to	be	like	a	man”31	and	“negate	a	woman	in	order	to	affirm	[them-
selves] as a man”.32	This	kind	of	“fight”	is	hostile	to	the	energy	of	life	and	to	
life represented as the will to power. The will to power cannot be destroyed 
and	should	not	be	a	subjected	to	biology	because	Nietzsche	sees	it	as	a	social-
ly	constructed	arrangement	of	 forces.	Based	on	 this	perspective,	Nietzsche	
advanced a powerful way of resisting social domination. The claim that wom-
en’s	modesty	usually	increases	with	their	beauty33 seems to be made without 





His attitude toward the problem of the sexes is part of his critical evaluation 
of	democracy	and	the	democratic	ideal.	Both	sexes	are	unified	 in	the	quest	
for equality and sameness that would erase the lines of difference resulting 
from	the	herd	mentality	of	the	weak,	which	gave	rise	to	male	morality	that	







place in the world by negating the value of the differences of others.
The irony of his sexual dualism must be viewed in the context of his criticism 
of all dualisms and universalisms. Sometimes his writings might come across 
as anti-feministic because he saw feminism and democracy as sicknesses of 
Europe	that	constitutes	a	new	form	of	slavery.	For	Nietzsche,	emancipation	
characterises the female attempts to gain access to a male-dominated world 
through	autonomy,	education	and	equal	rights,	but	with	the	consequence	of	
corrupting the female instincts.
The	 problem	 of	 the	 sexes	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 history	 of	 women’s	 oppression	
and	patriarchy.	As	Diana	Coole	emphasised,	many	Western	philosophers	go	
against changing the status quo	and	granting	equality	to	women.	Similarly,	






















This paper aims to show why Nietzsche believed that the problem of the sexes 
is inevitable. Nietzsche assumes that women possess the advantage stemming 





and the created image can be a base for psychotherapy. It can become a possi-
ble avenue for re-evaluating cultural values through a revitalisation of healthy 
femininity through a vigorous and strong dynamic between the sexes. 
What	would	 it	mean	 to	employ	a	 few	of	Nietzsche’s	subversive	notions	 to	
psychotherapy?	 Nietzsche	 is	 a	 significant	 and	 thought-provoking	 thinker,	
hence applying him to psychotherapy is an important and challenging endeav-
our.	Nietzsche	saw	himself	as	a	physician	of	culture;	he	has	envisioned	and	
shaped	the	dawning	artistry	of	psychotherapy,	redefining	psychotherapy	as	an	
experiment that explores the limits and the intricacies of human experience. 







out and then do the unmasking or interpretation of the search of the essence 
of	psychotherapy.	Interpretation	is	a	challenging	art,	and	this	is	a	niche	where	
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Nietzsche believes that it is necessary to say yes to life even in its strangest 
and	 intractable	problems,	 the	will	 to	 life,	celebrating	 its	 inexhaustibility,	 is	
the  bridge  to  the  psychology  of  the  tragic poet.42 The  philosophical  prac-
tice accepts philosophising primarily to help people overcome their personal 
problems	by	analysing	their	beliefs	about,	or	attitudes	towards,	their	situation	
or our inability to create ourselves.43 From	this	perspective,	for	Nietzsche,	a	
woman as a metaphor ought to have new meaning to allow her to discover 





pathos of distance in order to self-overcome oneself both socially and indi-
vidually. 
Woman as Metaphor
To	describe	 the	complexity	of	his	 thought,	Nietzsche	frequently	uses	 irony	
and	metaphors.	According	to	Nietzsche,	the	metaphor	is	a	fundamental	char-
acteristic	 of	 human	 intellect.	Metaphors	 extend	 a	 language’s	 capacities,	 so	
Nietzsche	defines	the	metaphor	as	a	word	that	“does	not	produce	new	words	
but	gives	a	new	meaning	to	them”,	and	irony	as	“words	to	say	the	opposite	of	














viewed	as	peace	and	one’s	own	“better	self”.46 This fantasy describes the nor-
mative	 sex	 issue	and	ensures	distance,	 and	according	 to	Nietzsche’s	 ironic	
words,	keeps	the	man	“safe”	in	his	dream	world.	Man	invents	a	fictional	reali-
ty	and	an	idealised	woman	as	an	escape	from	nature,	and	therefore	the	woman	










ing  creatures  see  through  the  gaze  of  their  imagination.  The  notion  of  life  
can	be	a	metaphor	for	the	fulfilment	 of	an	imagined	impossibility.	Because	






the woman symbolises the origin of  life  because of  her  power.  The female 




and the woman are represented as forces of difference. By using the woman 
as	a	metaphor	for	both	 truth	and	deception	(the	negative	side	of	 the	 truth),	
Nietzsche deviated from a bivalent or Aristotelian logic that operates based on 
distinctions.	According	to	Irigaray,	Nietzsche	affirms	the	woman	as	a	source	





it is part of the patriarchal attitude toward society. He attacked the idea that 
women	will	be	emancipated	once	they	secure	equal	rights	and	advance;	be-
cause modern ideas about society and politics have led to a degeneration in 
our thinking about the social roles and functions of men and women. Modern 
women	are	being	encouraged	to	fight	 for	“equal	rights”	but	this	struggle,	if	
successful,	will	 lead	to	a	gradual	erosion	of	women’s	 influence	 and	power.	
The concept  of  equality  allows  for  the  power  imbalance  between men and  
women to be reproduced.52 This analysis of the concept is part of philosophi-
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ders because Dionysus is a male god with a female appearance.57	Deleuze’s	
opinion was that eternal recurrence appears from the union of Dionysus and 
Ariadne,	moving	from	negation	to	affirmation.58	Ariadne,	as	a	symbol	of	the	
Dionysian	nihilistic	experience,	 is	reflected	 in	Nietzsche’s	 thinking	that	we	
must  learn  to  hate  in  order  to  love.59	Bivalent	 logic,	 affirmation	 and	nega-
tion,	are	basically	the	same	operation.	Nietzsche	stressed	the	nature	of	“du-
ality”,	stating	that	“there	is	no	Dionysian	appearance	without	an	Apollonian	




as a gift-giving virtue.
For	Nietzsche,	 the	 “perfect	 woman”	 is	 better	 than	most	men.	The	 perfect	
woman	is	a	higher	type	of	human	being	than	the	perfect	man,	and	at	the	same	
time,	something	that	is	much	rarer.61	But	is	she	better	or	equal	to	the	best	men,	




the unexhausted procreative will to life which is the will to power.62 The per-
fect	woman	tears	to	pieces	when	she	loves,	she	is	a	“maenad”63 because she 
is	capable	of	taking	the	opportunity	to	take	possession	of	man,	and	she	has	a	
desire to overpower and appear as if she has self-surrendered.64	Through	love,	
women actually become what they appear to be in the imagination of their  
lovers.65	Man	does	not	exclude	hate	from	his	definition	of	erotic	love,	since	
both	love	and	hate	are	powerful,	essentially	creative	emotions:
“Has	my	definition	 of	 love	been	heard?	 […]	Love,	 in	 its	means,	war;	 at	bottom,	 the	deadly	
hatred of the sexes.”66
This aspect can be used in psychotherapy as a tool enabling greater human 
effectiveness	or	to	modify	feelings,	conditions,	attitudes	and	conduct	which	
are	emotionally,	intellectually,	or	socially	inadequate	or	alienated.67
All  great  achievements  on the  part  of  the  man of  antiquity  were  supported 
by	the	fact	that	men	stood	beside	men,	and	that	a	woman	was	not	allowed	to	
claim	to	be	the	nearest	or	highest,	let	alone	the	sole	object	of	his	love	–	as	sex-




are endowed with are an almost numinous quality. We can learn from their 
intensity	and	irreducible	autonomy	in	the	same	way,	say,	in	which	we	humbly	
learn from a dream.70 The belief that a woman has in love and the appearance 
of	surrendering	to	love,	brings	her	power	over	others.	This	may	be	why	she,	
unlike	man,	is	loyal	to	the	concept	of	love.
Nietzsche	 does	 not	 have	 anything	 sentimental	 in	mind	 regarding	 love;	 the	
sexual	 agon,	 or	 contest,	 involves	 bodies,	 muscles,	 posture,	 emotions,	 and	
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Based	on	Nietzsche	perspective,	 philosophical	practice	 implements	 critical	
thinking which involves testing whether arguments stand up to critical inves-
tigation and considering whether we have good grounds to accept them and 
investigate  the  extent  to  which  critical  thinking  can  support  clients  toward  








using metaphors. In Beyond Good and Evil and The Gay Science,	Nietzsche	




there is no such thing. The aim is to understand the forces that produced these 
ideas about the truth.
Looking	at	the	naked	truth	would	be	difficult	and	dangerous,	but	also	an	epis-
temological necessity. The naked truth is not reachable because the woman 
who is truth and nature at the same time chooses to keep it concealed with the 
wish	for	it	not	to	be	seen,	maybe	because	she	is	hiding	something	repulsive.	
Nietzsche	 redefined	 truth	 and	 reality	 from	within	 life	 because	 he	 does	 not	
believe truth is separate from this world or reality is an outside experience. 
Truth	is	not	static,	but	dynamic;	it	is	not	a	structure	underlying	the	world	but	






ferently,	 he	 puts	woman/truth	 in	 a	 paradoxical	 position	 of	 both	 telling	 the	
truth and lying.76	The	surface	is	not	the	truth,	but	a	symptom,	a	sign,	of	that	
in which one needs to believe. Human beings impose their truth about life in-
stead of seeking truth within life. The conventional distinction between truth 
and deception coincide with the instituting social order because deceivers use 
valid	terms,	words	without	form,	full	of	emptiness,	to	make	the	unreal	appear	





much the rule and the law”.77
Truth	is	a	function	of	life,	but	it	is	not	strictly	pragmatic	or	utilitarian.	Nietzsche	
described the pursuit and discovery of truth not as a simple and easy task but 
rather	as	the	most	difficult	task,	from	which	most	retreat.	Nietzsche	affirmed	
the woman as the source of life only by denying her independent reality and 
experience of the world.
The	woman’s	veil	can	be	seen	as	an	illusory	barrier	that	serves	as	an	individu-
alising,	lifesaving	force,	or	as	a	perspective	that	will	distinguish	the	truth	from	






this art and this instinct.78 Truth cannot be unrevealed without horror. We are 
no longer capable of believing because education and morality have shaped 
us to the extent that truth remains true even after the veil has been removed. 
The	liar	uses	valid	terms,	words,	to	make	the	unreal	appear	real.
“Perhaps	the	truth	is	a	woman	who	has	reason	for	not	letting	us	see	her	reason?79	[…]	Perhaps	
her name is Baubo?”
Mystery	means	to	know	how	to	keep	something	at	a	distance,	not	to	refuse	
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mism	or	scepticism,	but	affirm	that	despite	death	life	can	come	back.80 As the 
story	of	Baubo	shows,	the	female	has	the	power	to	shock	and	disturb	common	
conceptions	 of	 womanhood,	 revealing	 subversive	 lewdness	 and	 obscenity.	
Baubo	can	appear	as	a	female	double	of	Dionysus,	but	like	life,	she	is	beyond	
the	 “metaphysical”	 distinction	of	male	 and	 female.	Dionysus	 is	 the	bridge	
between the veiled and unveiled masculine and feminine. Nietzsche returns 
truth to the world and translates man back into nature.81 Because of the circle 
of	woman,	truth,	and	nature,	Sarah	Kofman	connects	female	fertility	with	the	
idea	of	 the	productivity	of	 truth,	creativity	of	 life,	 its	cycle	of	creation	and	
decay,	the	circle	that	is	a	will	to	power,	a	will	to	dance,	a	will	to	innocence,	








capabilities,	to	achieve	the	impossible,	to give birth to himself as a self-made 
philosopher.  Maybe  Ansell-Pearson  is  not  right  in  his  claim that  Nietzsche  
expressed a fundamental resentment towards maternal creativity.83 Nietzsche 






ly-economically independent and cannot put in effect constructive change or 
growth and a deeply-ingrained purpose in life.85
Woman as Distance
Action	at	a	distance	is	women’s	“most	powerful	effect”,86  Nietzsche writes 
not without irony because he was trying all his life to maintain distance from 







min”,	“rabble”,	and	“hell	machine”88 and because of the baseness of their in-






because	 he	was	 not	 capable	 of	 altogether	 abandoning	 the	maternal	 figure.	
Abjection	has	its	ambiguity	because	it	is	necessary	for	every	child	to	abject	
its	mother	 in	order	 to	become	an	autonomous	 subject.90	But,	 the	 child	 can	
properly	go	through	abjection	only	with	the	support	of	the	“imaginary	father”	
because,	without	him,	the	child	would	abject	itself	instead.	Some	authors	see	
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the self and distance as the difference between the self and others. The pathos 
of distance within the self is governed by the will to power. The present self 
requires that we view ourselves from a distance in an image of ourselves. A 
distance	or	 difference	within	 the	 self,	 between	 the	present	 self	 and	 an	 im-
age	of	 self,	 is	necessary	 to	 transform	 the	corporeal	 self.	The	difference,	or	
distance,	between	the	two,	is	a	precondition	for	self-formation	and	transfor-
mation.	Woman,	operating	at	a	distance,	is	the	complementary	image	or	the	
difference	 to	what	man	 postulates	 in	 constituting	 himself	 as	 present.	Only	
the	‘empty	space’	between	them	is	affected	by	the	will	 to	power	as	 the	 in-
terpretation by which borders are established and bodies formed. Distancing 
(will	to	power	as	the	measurement	of	woman),	is	the	difference	that	precedes,	
exceeds and constitutes the distance among the self and between man and his 
‘other’	woman.94
In	 philosophical	 practice,	 philosophical	 inquiry	 aims	 at	 assisting	 in	 living	
a	 satisfying,	 productive,	meaningful	 and	 happy	 life,	which	 is	 in	 search	 of	
the	truth,	knowledge,	insight,	wisdom,	virtue.	Nietzsche’s	psychology	is	not	
founded	on	an	investigation	of	a	sample	of	subjects,	but	preferably	on	the	ob-
servation and experience of one human being with a developed sense of what 
is	applicable	and	humanly	universal,	with	the	ability	to	generate	to	others,	his	
own	experiences,	and	temptations,	disguises	the	problem	and	struggles	to	find	
a meaning in life.95 
Nietzsche illustrated the process  through an understanding of  biology96  be-
cause	physiology	is	 imperative	 to	our	comprehension	of	man.	Biology,	not	
philosophy,	holds	power	over	man	and	it	 is	a	basis	 in	 the	denial	of	equali-
ty	between	the	sexes.	Biology	secures	the	dynamics	of	one’s	actions.97 The 
struggle itself and participation in the byplay of forces can qualitatively alter 
each individual means to power.98
Both	women	and	men	deceive	themselves	about	each	other,	because	what	they	
honour and esteem are their own ideals. Man tries to be peaceful and obedient 
when	the	woman’s	nature	is	to	be	essentially	“unpeaceful”	and	“wild”.99 The 




and	differentiated	with	 reference	 to	man	 and	not	 he	with	 reference	 to	 her,	
because	he	is	Subject,	he	is	Absolute,	she	is	Other”.101	A	woman’s	role	as	the	
Other	makes	her	an	actress	who	depends	on	pretence	and	illusion	to	survive.	
Her	mistake	 is	 that	she	allows	herself	 to	be	caught	up	 in	her	own	 illusion,	
incapable of self-representation and self-creation.
Women	are	taught	to	be	ashamed	of	eroticism,	“they	are	supposed	to	have	nei-
ther	eyes	nor	ears	nor	words	nor	thoughts	for	this	–	their	‘evil’”.102 Nietzsche 
understands  the  cruelty  of  morality  that  demands  of  women  to  deny  their  





but	in	the	case	of	woman,	silence	is	born	out	of	her	fear	of	man.103 The themes 
of	silencing,	articulation,	and	the	need	to	take	life	into	control	define	today’s	













The metaphor of the whip can be explained in relation to keeping the woman 
at	a	distance	–	the	concept	of	woman	that	man	forms	for	himself	has	no	effect	
on the woman. This metaphor must be understood as a mark of irony because 
the	whip	is	mentioned	by	a	“little	old	woman”,	but	it	could	be	Zarathustra’s	
statement,	or	it	might	also	be	Nietzsche’s.	On	the	other	hand,	Nietzsche	stated	
that	the	“woman	should	be	silent	about	the	woman”,106 offering to the reader 
new	possibilities	for	understanding	or	forcing	the	reader	to	find	 the	solution	
to the riddle.
Man creates for himself the image of woman107	or,	more	generally,	man	cre-
ates women in the same way he creates his world. This suggests that women 
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her shame is the result of her being revealed as surface.
























ed	that	“there	is	an	unchangeable	this	is	I	about	man	and	woman”.111 At that 
station are separate kinds of sexuality with biological attributes that provide 
themselves to divergence in the spirit of male and female characters.
These	Nietzschean	 traits	 give	 rise	 to	 divergence,	 tension	 and	 struggle	 and	
are	essential	for	satisfaction,	progression	and	living.	Due	to	the	fact	of	their	
physiological	discrepancy,	these	instincts	can	be	our	greatest	source	of	power.













cates that there is no equal pathos nor will for renunciation.115	“Love	makes	




does not exist. Both sides wish to become the same and create a beautiful and 
mad	spectacle	to	dissolve	boundaries,	gender	rules,	and	identities.










the solution? She closes her eyes to her.”117
There is a possibility for self-formation besides the impossible image posited 
by	man.	Because	of	this,	a	woman’s	artistry	lies	in	her	power	of	dissimulation,	
in	uncovering	the	veil	that	is	her	surface.	Women	carry	a	mask,	and	society	
views them as  different  from men because  of  this  created mask.  Nietzsche 








ibility	 of	 the	 unconscious:	 past	 experiences	 partly	 determine	 the	 uncon-
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“necessity	of	an	eternally	hostile	tension	between	the	sexes”.123 Insisting on 
the	“state	of	nature	and	the	eternal	war	between	the	sexes”,	Nietzsche	recog-
nised	a	superior	position	of	the	woman,	creatively	speaking,	because	this	kind	
of woman is focused on becoming. Nietzsche celebrated female sexuality as 
something powerful and subversive but also feared it when it becomes disas-
sociated from the social functions of child upbringing and motherhood.
The	artistic	creation	of	merging	these	ideas,	based	on	identifying	the	reasons	
they	sustain,	observing	their	impact	on	current	problems	and	resolving	is	the	
sphere of philosophical  practice.  The goal  is  to help clients formulate their  
own	view	of	the	world,	which	bears	on	their	everyday	life,	and	critically	ex-
plore	the	problematic	aspects,	modify	and	enhance	or	expand	their	outlook	of	
the world as needed.
Nietzsche  renounced  developments  in  cognitive  psychobiology  concerning  
language,	consciousness,	and	the	will.	He	was	first	 to	describe	and	consider	
multiplicity in personality theory and developed an original contribution to 
the	psychology	of	morality,	societal	and	health	psychology.	He	was	the	prede-
cessor	of	action	psychotherapy,	acceptance	therapy,	narrative	psychotherapy	
and cognitive behavioural therapy.




can only obstruct it”.124	He	could	not	enlighten	us	on	what	to	do	in	life,	but	he	
had	much	to	offer	on	how	to	do	what	we	chose,	how	to	lead	our	life,	how	to	
climb and cross over on the rope of life.
“If	we	 are	 sensible,	 the	 only	 thing	 that	 need	 concern	 us	 is	 that	 we	 should	 have	 joy	 in	 our	
hearts.”125
Conclusion
Nietzsche	 is	 a	 powerful	 thinker,	 and	 his	 concepts,	 including	 joy,	 enhance-
ment,	will	for	power	and	life,	self-affirmation,	self-respect,	and	self-love,	are	
implemented	into	psychotherapy.	His	perspective	can	redefine	psychotherapy	
as an experiment that explores the limits and intricacies of human experience. 

















rather than personal individualisation”.130
Does  the  therapist  help  her  client  unveil  a  pre-existing  truth  known  to  the  
therapist?	Client	and	therapist	together	create	truth	by	“taking	the	risk	of	com-
municating”.131 This is a risk worth taking because the client and the therapist 
may	come	to	bear	witness	to	the	evanescent	coming-into-being,	through	dia-
logue,	of	a	truth	forged	in	an	encounter	rather	than	the	unveiling	of	a	pre-ex-
isting,	 a-historical	 truth	 behind	 the	 course	 of	 events.132  Nietzsche  wanted  
growth,	 or,	more	 precisely,	 the	 feeling	 of	 growth,	 the	 feeling	 of	 increased	




of seeking understanding to cure problems.133
A Nietzschean perspective can lead to new lights and new ways on how to 
approach	 psychotherapy.	 The	modern	 person	 is	 presented	 as	 the	 “last	 hu-
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relations between classes but also to relations between the sexes. To the extent 
that	Nietzsche	excludes	women	from	the	possibility	of	self-overcoming,	he	
effectively builds his personal aesthetics upon the bodies of women.136
Richardson	brings	up	the	possibility	that	“just	as	Zarathustra	hides	his	truth	











Philosophical practice might be applicable for the perception that Nietzsche 
wants,	summarised	 in	growth	and	the	process	of	self-formulation.	Strength	
in	a	healthy	organism	is	the	desire	to	give,	even	to	squander	one’s	resources:	
the will to power is at heart generosity.141 The distancing affected by the will 
to  power  on  self-overcoming  materially  constitutes  woman  as  other  to  the  
aesthetic	self.	Nietzsche’s	formulation	of	a	distance	within	the	self	re-opens	
what	is	denied	by	social	discourses	which,	in	assuming	an	unchanging	subject	
over	time,	assume	that	“what	is	does	not	become”.142 While the key to creativ-
ity	lies	in	maintaining	this	action	at	a	distance,	something	remains	to	be	said	
about its effect on women.
Nietzsche not only claims that the creative man must distance himself from 
the	image	of	woman	he	necessarily	constitutes,	but	also	that	“woman	forms	
herself according to this image”.143	The	truth	of	woman,	the	eternal	feminine,	
promises	 to	affirm	 an	unchanging	self.	But	given	 that	 identity	 is	constitut-
ed	in	relation,	the	self	that	posits	itself	as	autonomous	and	transcendental	is	
not	complete	without	 the	incorporation	or	negation	of	what	 is	other:	man’s	
desire  is  to  possess  this  image of  the  woman he has  constituted in  relation 
to himself.144 Women are only artistic insofar as they are actors of a role im-
posed upon them. For women to be artistic in the proper sense would require 
the	ability	to	incorporate	experience	according	to	one’s	own	plan.	Woman’s	
artistry lies in her power of deception. This requires distance within the self 
between  the  present  self  and  the  concept  or  image  towards  which  one  as-
pires,	which	is	predicated	upon	a	distance	between	self	and	other.	According	
to	Nietzsche, there are two modes of self-constitution available to women in 
relation	to	men:	proximity,	resulting	from	the	possession	of	a	man,	and	action	
at	a	distance.	Submission	results	in	the	constitution	of	woman’s	bodily	self	as	
a rigid image of shame because submission collapses the difference between 
her	appearance	(surface)	and	the	concept	of	unfathomable	depth	man	has	of	
her.145	 Regarding	 action	 at	 a	 distance,	 from	 a	woman’s	 point	 of	 view,	 this	







least as long as women are artistic.146
“Nietzsche’s	work	restored	the	soul	to	our	understanding	of	man.”147
The	role	of	Nietzsche’s	“eternal	 feminine”	 image	of	woman	 is	 the	guiding	
motivation to man. She has been the generator of inspiration through illusion. 
While this vision of a woman as a muse is part of her traditional role in socie-
ty,	it	will	be	part	of	his	treatment	for	her	future	power	as	well.	Women	will	use	
this power to produce a new illusion for man. Creation of an illusion is one of 
the	most	enhancing	and	compelling	of	life’s	powers.148 The inability to know 
a	“true”	woman	is	central	to	understanding	Nietzsche.	It	is	a	moral	prejudice	
that	the	“truth	is	worth	more	than	a	simple	appearance”.149 Nietzschean wom-
en are all masks. This does not mean that Nietzsche wants women to continue 
to	endure	the	same	mask	eternally,	but	rather	that	illusion	(though	dangerous)	
is  powerful  and  necessary.150  Woman  in  wearing  masks  is  not  adapting  to  
man-made	identities;	she	creates	the	illusion.	She	is	the	creator.	She	used	her	
power to create illusions around the imaginations of men. She practised this 
to use her power to increase security and avoid work.151
Further	growth	of	man	is	connected	explicitly	to	the	“antagonism	between	the	
sexes”.152	Our	enhancement	rests	in	the	continual	power	struggle,	the	sustained	
existence	of	 two	sexes,	 two	opposites	 in	eternal	opposition.	Nietzsche	does	
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what is irreducible about the other. Irigaray situated this irreducible difference 
primarily	in	sexual	difference,	a	concept	born	out	of	psychoanalysis	and	dis-
tinct	 from	 sex	 difference	 as	 a	 biological	 classification.154	Unlike	 the	 latter,	
sexual	difference	refers	to	the	way	subjects	form	their	identities	through	the	
world	as	a	sexed	world,	that	is,	a	world	historically	organised	on	the	basis	of	




Prema Nietzscheovu mišljenju, temeljni je problem između muškarca i žene duboko ukorijenjen 
u negiranju antagonizma među njima. Muškarac vjeruje da njihov odnos mora biti vječna 
neprijateljska napetost i neizbježna nepravda. Nietzsche tvrdi da mora postojati rangirajući 
poredak u kojem je skaliranje vezano za aktivnosti uzimanja, nakupljanja i postajanja 
boljim zadobivajući moć i nadilazeći uža tumačenja. Ovo rangiranje ne dopušta istovjetnost 
i ravnopravnost, što su znakovi plitkoće instinkta i gubitka identiteta. Nietzsche podržava 
različitost i slavi drugotnost. Uspijevanje pojedinca nikada ne može biti ometano pojmom 
jednakih odnosa. Nietzsche je uvjeren da su ljudi drugačiji i zagovara agon (borba moći) kao 
model kulturnih i političkih odnosa. Budući da se jednakost ljudskih bića mora sastojati od 
jednakog iznosa istog svojstva, Nietzsche tu jednakost vidi kao predstavljenu u općoj volji za 
moć. Nadalje, rodna je razlika također društveno konstruiran način bivanja. To je kreacija 
muške slike o tome kako bi svijet trebao izgledati. Ako se uključi u terapijski pristup, ova 
nam perspektiva može baciti novo svjetlo na moguće intervencijske metode u psihoterapiji 
i filoterapiji podjednako. Spol i spolni odnosi mogu biti izlučeni kao ključan problem koji 
prevladava u jezgri motivacije za traženje profesionalne terapijske pomoći (psihoterapija), bez 
obzira na to koji se terapijski pristup u takvoj praksi koristi. Tema je to koja nije dovoljno vukla 
iz Nietzscheove tradicije. Cilj je rada ponuditi argumente za to da se Nietzscheov pogled na 









Philosophische Praxis im Lichte des „Geschlechterkrieges“
Zusammenfassung
Nach Nietzsches Ansicht schlägt das grundlegende Problem zwischen Mann und Frau („Weib“) 
seine Wurzeln tief in der Leugnung des Antagonismus zwischen ihnen. Ein Mann glaubt, dass 
ihre Beziehung eine ewige feindselige Spannung und eine unabwendbare Ungerechtigkeit 
sein muss. Nietzsche stellt die Behauptung auf, dass es eine Rangordnung geben muss, in 
der  die  Skalierung  mit  den  Aktivitäten  des  Nehmens,  Akkumulierens  und  der  Verbesserung  
durch Machtgewinnung und Überwindung engerer Interpretationen zusammenhängt. Diese 
Rangfolge duldet keine Ausgleichbarkeit und Gleichheit, die Anzeichen für einen flachen 
Instinkt und einen Identitätsverlust sind. Nietzsche unterstützt die Verschiedenheit und feiert 
die  Andersheit.  Der  Erfolg  eines  Individuums  kann  niemals  durch  den  Begriff  der  gleichen  
Beziehungen beeinträchtigt werden. Nietzsche ist überzeugt, dass Menschen anders sind, 
und befürwortet den Agon (Wettkampf) als Modell kultureller und politischer Beziehungen. 
Da die  Gleichheit  der  menschlichen  Wesen  aus  einer  gleichen  Menge  derselben  Eigenschaft  
bestehen muss, sieht Nietzsche diese Gleichheit als vertreten im allgemeinen Willen zur 
Macht. Fernerhin ist der Genderunterschied gleichfalls eine sozial konstruierte Art des Seins. 
Es ist die Kreation eines männlichen Bildes davon, wie die Welt aussehen sollte. Falls diese 
Perspektive in den therapeutischen Ansatz einbezogen wird, kann sie neues Licht auf potenzielle 
Interventionsmethoden innerhalb der Psychotherapie und Philotherapie gleichermaßen werfen. 
Geschlecht und Geschlechtsverkehr können als Schlüsselproblem herausgeschält werden, 
das im Kern der Motivation dominiert, professionelle therapeutische Hilfe (Psychotherapie) 
aufzusuchen, ungeachtet dessen, welcher therapeutische Ansatz in einer solchen Praxis 
verwendet wird. Es ist ein Thema, das nicht zureichend aus Nietzsches Tradition stammt. 
Die Intention dieses Papers ist es, Argumente dafür zu liefern, Nietzsches Perspektive des 





La philosophie pratique à la lumière de « la guerre des genres »
Résumé
Selon la pensée de Nietzsche, le problème fondamental entre les hommes et les femmes est 
profondément enraciné dans le déni de l’antagonisme qui leur est propre. L’homme considère 
que leur relation repose sur une éternelle tension hostile et une inévitable injustice. Nietzsche 
affirme qu’un ordre de classement doit exister dans lequel la mise à l’échelle est liée à l’action 
de  s’emparer,  d’accumuler  et  de  devenir  meilleur  en  gagnant  en  puissance  et  en  dépassant  
les  étroites  interprétations.  Ce  classement  ne  permet  pas  d’identité  et  d’égalité,  signes  d’un  
instinct superficiel et d’une perte d’identité. Nietzsche soutient la diversité et célèbre l’altérité. 
La réussite d’un individu ne doit  jamais être perturbé par le concept d’égalité des relations.  
Nietzsche est convaincu que les gens sont différents et défend l’agôn (lutte pour le pouvoir) en 
tant que modèle pour les relations culturelles et politiques. Étant donné que l’égalité des êtres 
humains doit contenir une quantité égale de propriétés identiques, Nietzsche conçoit cette éga-
lité comme présentée dans la volonté générale de puissance. En outre, la différence des genres 
est également un mode d’être construit socialement. C’est la création masculine d’une image 
sur le monde. Si on l’introduit au sein d’une approche thérapeutique, cette perspective éclaire 
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d’un jour nouveau les possibles méthodes d’intervention en psychothérapie et philothérapie de 
manière égale. Le genre et les relations de genres peuvent être dégagés comme un problème clé 
qui prend le dessus au cœur de la motivation visant à rechercher une aide thérapeutique pro-
fessionnelle (psychothérapie), quel que soit l’approche thérapeutique utilisée dans une pratique 
de ce genre. Ce thème n’a pas suffisamment été puisé dans la tradition nietzschéenne. L’objectif 
de ce travail et de proposer des arguments afin que la perspective nietzschéenne de « la guerre 
des genres » s’établisse dans un contexte productif pour l’intervention psychothérapeutique et 
la consultation philosophique.
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